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Abstract

This article discusses sanctions as a foreign policy tool and provides an analysis of past academic publications published by Hufbauer et al., Rodman, Pape, Hanlon et al., Black et al., Drury, Lacy et al., Eaton et al., Drezner, Lektzian et al., Morgan, and Andreas. Following this discussion is an idealized guide for policy makers to evaluate from the offset of their discussions whether or not to implement and/or threaten a ‘target’ with economic sanction regimes using the variables discussed by these scholars and those which seem to be common sense. It seems from the discussions however, that the complexities of globalization and human psychology are calling for new measures to coerce nations into compliance and hopefully this article will aid in this discussion towards finding a solution.

Introduction

Sanctions as a coercive foreign policy tool has been used and maintained in international relations ever since the organization of cities and city states. The first recorded case of sanctions took place in 432 B.C. when Pericles issued the Megarian decree limiting entry of Megaran products into the city state of Athens. This sanctions regime came in response to Megaran’s attempted territorial expropriation of Athenian territory and the subsequent kidnapping of three Athenian women. As was the case then, and remains today, the use of sanctions is an attempt to avoid military confrontation; however, in Megaran’s case this sanction, i.e. trade embargo, led to the Peloponnesian War due to the parties’ inability to reach consensus. The failure to reach a common ground and coerce the ‘target’ into compliance already demonstrated the lack of effectiveness of this foreign policy when carried out unilaterally.

Traditionally, sanctions took all entailing comprehensive methods such as trade embargoes, financial restrictions, and political/ diplomatic condemnation, i.e. severing international ties with the ‘target’. The use of sanctions has slowly been moving away from the use of comprehensive restrictions to incorporating so called ‘smart sanctions’ also known as ‘targeted sanctions’. This shift has been undertaken in order to increase this foreign policy...
tool’s effectiveness and efficiency. It seems, however, that ‘smart sanctions’ still lack effective results as they seldom are able to coerce regimes into compliance such as in the cases of Iran, Cuba and Myanmar. Reasons for which sanctions are used are as varied as their applications and include issues ranging from national sovereignty to humanitarianism - these are all directed by national principles and agendas.

Today, sanctions are more commonly used in a multilateral fashion. Multilaterally they have been imposed by regional trading blocks such as the European Union but are more frequently implemented by international organizations such as the United Nations’ Security Council, NAFTA, ASEAN, and the African Union also have the ability to coerce member and non-member states into compliance through the use of sanctions; however, to date these regional economic organizations have not imposed any sanction regimes onto its members or affiliates as dialogue is preferred as a method for conflict resolution. Rather than advancing the imposition of sanctions, these regional blocks have merely supported efforts by the UNSC through international accord.

The United States as a member of NAFTA is the single most sanctioning nation which has not only threatened but also unilaterally imposed sanctions on others without the support of its regional members (Canada and Mexico)- See Cuba as an example. This condition may be due to the political economic significance the United States once carried in setting policies and agendas across the region and the world at large. Any advance made by trading groups would have to be in a multilateral fashion to increase their effectiveness upon the ‘target’ as an individual nation today lacks sufficient political and/or economic leverage to coerce a ‘target’ due to the economic inter-connections of states.

Individual nations in the 21st century are playing a less significant role in this form of international economic and political condemnation due to the dynamic environment of the global community. Globalization is downplaying national powers of individual states, replacing them with trading blocs and Unions in the promotion and pursuit of common regional and global interests. According to Hufbauer, Schott, and Elliot (1990) the United States however, remains the nation of the 21st century with the most reported cases of unilateral sanctions against so called violators, nevertheless, it seems that the United States even as the primary and largest member of its block (NAFTA) is losing its hegemonic and economic significance which in the past allowed the country to pursue national agendas without international support. In conjunction with this, the intense financial and economic interconnections of nations does not allow states to impose sanctions without suffering financial losses. Global economies are increasingly interdependent on each other in terms of the acquisition of natural resources, access to markets and economic liabilities (i.e. debt) incurred in the pursuit of global economic stability.

**Literature Review**

Social scientists in the area of sanction research have mainly inquired about the correct use of sanctions, their overall effectiveness, and the necessary preconditions for their success. Scholars also discuss the meaning of success but fail to provide viable alternatives. The large scale inquiry on the use of economic sanctions began due to the rampant increase of this foreign policy tool in the 21st century, both uni - and multilaterally. These scholars have mainly focused their attention on providing theoretical discussions upon the effects of sanctions, their outcomes and why these outcomes have been achieved.

Some scholars maintain that only through strict measures and objectives (Pape,1998; Rodman, 2001) outcomes can be achieved, while others consider
partial achievements a success (Hufbauer, Schott, & Elliot, 1990). However, most scholars today agree that comprehensive sanctions by in large fail to achieve their aim as a stand alone tool due to the complexities of globalizations and the creation of self-reliant states as a consequence of the game. To why exactly sanctions fail and how sanctions can be fine tuned to achieve their aims remains part of today’s discussion. One such movement claiming increased effectiveness is for the use of ‘smart sanctions’ which was brought about the Copenhagen, Berlin, and Vienna accords. Scholars, as well as observers of sanction regimes, have begun questioning the effectiveness of sanctions as a coercive and proactive tool due to the lack of achievement, i.e. compliance by the ‘target’. This lack of positive outcomes has been linked to the lack of objective and clear outcomes been sought. Furthermore, increasing civilian costs to ‘target’ populations and financial costs to ‘senders’ are a deterrent force to nations to engage in this foreign policy game and consequently their commitment for prolonged engagement if they seek to retain a resolute image in the international arena. Advocates for laissez fair, i.e. free trade, also strongly oppose this type of intervention, as it goes against the philosophy proposed by Adam Smith of market driven economies, and thus these individuals call for new and more effective measures to coerce governments without states interfering into business operations. Sanctions literature has undergone three main changes, loosing ground for optimism in the third and current phase. Phase one literature was typically characterized by optimism due to the more or less effective use of this foreign policy tool to achieve its main aim, regime change and/or deterrence of national/ international policies by the ‘target’. Some fiascos, however, did occur during this time, raising questions even in the early part of academic discourse on this issue. One main reason why in the past sanctions seemed to have been more effective than today can be regarded as the closer ties which existed between nations, i.e. strong bi-lateral relationships. Literature produced during this era was relativist and documented circumstances and outcomes of individual sanctioning episodes. This phase largely neglected to formulate theoretical frameworks on the overall use of this policy. Effects on target populations were acknowledged, however, played a less substantial role in discussions on how to meet national agendas.

Phase two sanction literature commenced questioning the use of sanctions as an efficient and effective foreign policy tool. Scholars at this stage began incorporating theoretical and analytical models into their discussions to explain and predict the necessary conditions under which sanctions do and should succeed and/or fail. These discussions facilitated the illustration of independent and dependent variables affecting outcomes. Several main ‘targets’ began fueling this discussion, the lack of response of Cuba to US trade embargoes, and the fiasco of Rhodesia. During this second stage, scholars also began arguing when sanctions could be regarded as having succeeded and when new alternative policies should be implemented. However, all scholars at this stage agreed that military engagement was a clear sign of failure, as sanctions are intended to avoid this financial costly alternative. The third and current phase can by categorized by skepticism and a push towards identifying new methods to achieve national agendas through a fine tuning of sanctions, i.e. ‘smart sanctions’, while incorporating the use of ‘carrots’ and ‘sticks’ to forge compliance by the ‘target’. This phase has been driven primarily by international observers and civil rights groups, discussing and demonstrating sanctioning episodes which obviously have failed in their aims, Iran, North Korea and Myanmar. Not only have observers recognized that sanctions have failed to achieve their aim, but also that this foreign policy tool has been detrimental to ‘target’ populations, depriving them in some cases of even the most fundamental
of rights outlined in the United Nations Human Rights Conventions, due to their exclusion from international markets. Furthermore, scholars have also recognized that sanctions can have reverse effects, rather than weakening states, sanctions have the ability to strengthen national ties within the ‘target’ as well as creating self-sufficient economies; however, when territory and international ties permit. The United States grain embargo against the former Soviet Union is one such example. Furthermore, the absence of military force was also questioned due to its ability to provide a powerful and sometimes detrimental stick in the game and thus a significant coercive force.

The Three Phases

Phase I: Between 1960 and 1989, sanctions literature took a static view on the changing conditions during and post sanctioning episodes using case study approaches for their analysis. These case-study approaches can effectively be described as documentary, rather than basing discussions upon theoretical frameworks and the identification of variables affecting outcomes. Nevertheless, these discussions aided in future academic discourse to identify some of the more effective independent and dependent variables affecting sanctions’ outcomes. In 1987 Joseph Hanlon and Roger Omon published a very ample case study regarding the effects of comprehensive economic trade sanctions on South Africa with the aim of eliminating the predominant system of racial segregation known as Apartheid. This study is exceptionally inclusive, detailing pre-existing condition driving the imposition of sanctions and the domestic and international dynamics leading to the implementations and successive regime change, the main objective for the implementation of such measures. This publication does not, however, make any reference to the ways for identifying when sanctions can be considered to have succeeded or failed, or what the main variables affecting their success are as it seems that the use of sanctions needs to take a relativist approach towards its implementation and understanding. This issue was not considered due to the so-called success of the South African sanctions episode. Not only did these authors neglect theoretical frameworks for their discussion, but also were unable to take a long term perspective on outcomes. Hanlon and Omon (1987) saw sanctions as a success, however, in retrospect, and through current observation of South Africa and its social stratus, sanctions have failed to create change. Yes, the institution of Apartheid was eliminated; however, today’s Afrikaans still live in a very segregated society, making social movement possible but very difficult and to a large extent unwanted. Criminalization of predominant black areas of South Africa is also another consequence of this sanctions episode, being able to say, as Peter Andreas would most certainly agree, that sanctions have failed. In 1987, Black and Cooper published the first attempt at an analytical sanctions model. The model developed primarily focused on measuring the welfare losses of states in terms of consumer and producer surpluses. According to the authors, the identification of surpluses provided a way for classifying whether or not sanctions had succeeded in their efforts. This model did not attempt to identify the necessary conditions for success; however, it began the discussion on how to identify whether or not sanctions had achieved to coerce a nation away from its course of action, i.e. deterrent, or at least created an impact upon the ‘target’. Economic impacts, nevertheless, can by no means be called a success, as economic deterioration, as later scholars claim and demonstrate, will hurt the masses and not the people for which sanctions are intended, thus, failing to create an upward effect. Some may argue that by hurting the masses opposition will be created which will take its natural path, i.e. removing the ruling elite through ousting and coup d’états. Nevertheless, as leaders become more paranoid and oppressive in order to retain their rule, this
opposition is kept to a bare minimum through direct use of force. In North Korea and Myanmar for instance, the ruling elite has been successful at oppressing the masses and minority groups through military force, evidenced in the continuously increasing military expenditure, the growing number of members of the armed forces, the extermination of villages, rape and pillaging by soldiers. Myanmar continues to launch campaigns against minority groups to weaken opposition, while North Korea strongly attacks national defectors, punishing those with death.

Phase II (the inclusion of models): In 1990 the most widely acclaimed and cited sanctions literature was published by Hufbauer, Schott, and Elliot. These scholars moved beyond a simple qualitative research approach to a quantitative research study of more than 110 sanctioning episodes. This study became the basis for future scholars to frame their discussions on the topic. Hufbauer’s discussion is in line with the discussion maintained by Black and Cooper, measuring the effects of sanctions episodes on the basis of costs, both to ‘sender’ and ‘receiver’. Moving beyond this analysis, Hufbauer et al. provide a framework for policy makers to estimate their chances of success and engagement prior to implementing this form of policy using the indicators described in their book. This framework is very simplified and can only be used as a starting point for discussion on whether to consider this approach; a more ample framework should be used to call it a theoretical framework. Hufbauer et al., however, provided some clear indicators to when sanctions can be viewed as having failed, using the variable of time. According to the authors, if sanctions have been in place for 2+ years, sanctions can be regarded as failed and will never achieve their aim. Some peers in the field have criticized Hufbauer’s approach claiming a selection bias due to their range of sanctioning episodes to compile their work. This criticism is founded on the grounds that Hufbauer only chose sanction episodes which had been imposed, disregarding those cases in which threats were voiced, resolving the issue without actually having to impose sanctions or engage in military confrontation. A list of imposed sanctions is merely easier to compile because of available documentation, however, for sake of accuracy and reliance of the study, Hufbauer et al. should have researched archives further to find and document those sanctioning episodes which were resolved without being implemented. Some deductions made by Hufbauer et al., however, are very useful and applicable to understanding why and when sanctions can succeed, and when one may want to consider a new alternative. Nevertheless, Hufbauer’s study is clearly too optimistic regarding the rate of success of this foreign policy tool. Cooper Drury in 1993, made an attempt to explain the effects and efficacy of sanctions using an econometric model, much in line with what some discussions had attempted to do. This model focuses solely on economic indicators to explain and evaluate weather or not sanctions have or will create an effect upon the ‘receiver’ state. Indicators proposed by Drury are those of Gross National Product (GNP), domestic production/ output/ export/ import of goods and services. This analysis disregards the importance and creation of black markets which typically result following the imposition of sanction regimes due to the need of people to meet their most basic needs for survival. Underground ‘black markets’ are not well recorded and can constitute, as Hernando de Soto discovered in this study of “The Mystery of Capital” in 2000, 50% of a nation’s economy. However, the dimension of these markets largely depends upon whether or not a nation is considered developed, i.e. has established market surveillance and enforcement mechanisms and international ties, or is underdeveloped or in the process of developing, lacking these market mechanisms, enforcements and ties. Furthermore, the actual size of the market in these underdeveloped economies, even if known to the regime, will not be public, due to nation’s
ability to attract development funds for humanitarian purposes, especially in today’s illusive push towards meeting the United Nation’s MDGs. In 1992 and 1999 respectively, Jonathan Eaton and Maxim Engers incorporated a Game Theoretical Model into their discussion. This analysis revolved around expected reactions of a target in regard to sanction agendas. This use of a Game Theoretical Model was also illustrated by Lisa Martin in 1992, focusing on preferences and positions. In their discussion these authors claim that the more separable preferences are, the more likely nations are able to reach resolve, at least among irresolute players. The opposite is the case among resolute, or irresolute-resolute relationship dyads, best example of this can be seen in North Korea and Iran with their continued nuclear proliferation movements. In the case of Iran, however, internal pressure groups seem to be forming today and Amedinajad’s slow realization that nuclearization is not a deterrent for the International community to act, is demonstrating that Iran is not a resolute player and that targeted multilateral sanctions could possibly achieve change through internal opposition and a halting of the nuclear program in order to resume trade in the pursuit of economic growth. Lacy and Niou (1998) also made approaches toward understanding outcomes on the basis of relationships and preferences. In their finding, standing relationships among nations are more significant at understanding outcomes rather than focusing on preferences as Eaton, Engers and Martin did. Lacy and Niou argue that past relationships between ‘sender’ and ‘receiver’ have a direct impact upon achievement. These scholars claim that if a ‘sender’ and ‘receiver’ had previous relationships a game of complete and/or semi-complete information could lead to resolve. The opposite is also the case. If nations have not had prior relationships, or very limited relationships, information will be scarce and for the most part incomplete, thus resolve will be more difficult to be achieved due to the inability of states to correctly predicting reactions to the actions in a situation of mixed dyads. In a realist world, full information disclosure is a utopian ideal, as it is impossible for nations to gain full knowledge of each other due to the complexities of human psychology. Because of this, previous relationships in trade and politics, and the weight of trade balances, i.e. surplus and deficit, is a more significant predictor to achieving outcomes.

Moving beyond explanations why sanctions succeed or fail and the dynamics behind explaining their outcomes, Daniel Drezner (2000) published a research paper focusing on the dynamics of cooperation and the significant bodies in successful sanctioning efforts, i.e. multilateralism. Up to this point, scholars believed that resolve could only be achieved through multilateral approaches and that a unilateral advance to the sanctions game represents a waste of resources. The United Nations today still maintains that multilateral approaches to sanctions are the effective way to achieve compliance, nevertheless the UN lacks the necessary enforcement mechanisms which individual nations can provide through their legal system and national sanctions mechanisms. As the world is becoming more and more globalized, it does seem that multilateral approached would best be suited to achieve aims, however, it is difficult to coordinate these efforts. Furthermore, the benefit of engagement with a sanctioned nation is high, especially for its neighbors where entrepreneurial spirits will most certainly render sanction ineffective. Drezner, however, claims the opposite. According to Drezner “repeated statistical tests show either no link or a negative correlation between cooperation and sanctions success” (Drezner, 2000). From his research Drezner concludes that multilateral sanctions are “sabotaged not by bargaining problems, but rather by enforcement difficulties” (Drezner, 2000). In his research Drezner concludes that multilateral sanctions are not have to be multilateral; they can be
unilaterally imposed as long as one condition prevails, the ‘sender’ is the largest and main trading partner of the ‘target’. This precondition is important because it will increase leverage over the process of negotiations, which consequently could lead to resolve or compliance. Drezner does not, however, disregard the importance and efficiency of multilateral sanctions but claims that these need to have “the full support of all international organizations and states” (Drezner, 2000) in order to convert a fragile equilibrium into a more robust one. Kenneth Rodman (2001) in his discussion moved beyond explaining conditions for failure or success, and ways to measure these outcomes, to incorporating entities important in the sanctioning game. As has been mentioned, globalization has changed the methods for imposing sanctions. The main players in our globalized world are not nations but international- and multinational corporations (MNC). According to Rodman MNCs are key to sanction’s success because of their economic importance and leverage on the ‘target’, both in terms of revenue and employment. In his study of US MNCs, Rodman finds that MNCs are less free from parent-state control thus representing a good mechanism through which to impose and pressure upon a ‘target’ to force compliance and/or resolve. In his analysis, Rodman disregards the importance of investor-business relationships and the need to pursue continued profitable and sustainable grow to maintain and foster investment and attract necessary capital for future business development and international competitiveness. It is certainly true that the political risk index is a key to business when conducting their risk and exposure analysis. However, certain commodities, and companies engaged in extracting and retailing these resources will be enticed to overlook posed risks in pursuit of high short term gains. This is a basic economic tenet stating that low risk will lead to low return, while high risk will lead to either no return or very high payoffs. Oil and natural resources such as gold and diamonds are such commodities as can be observed in the US engagement in Iraq and in other conflict areas of the world. David Lektzian and Mark Souva (2001) were the first to claim that the use of sanctions is fundamentally flawed and ineffective. Nevertheless Lektzian and Souva claim, contrary to Drezner, that sanctions today are international in nature and must be approached as that, in a coordinated multilateral effort not merely in a unilateral neo-conservative manner. In a later study by Lektzian and Souva (2003) the authors incorporated an analysis of political structures to help explain outcomes. Each political structure of ‘sender’ ‘receiver’ has a direct impact upon outcomes. These structures were simplified into democratic vs. autocratic systems. According to Lektzian and Souva, democratic dyads are more apt to achieve resolve due to the democratic people centered nature of the country, having to follow the voice of the masses. In democracies, the government is merely the representative of the people, thus, if the people want to comply with international forces due to possible or actual harm to the nation, opposition groups will build around the issue forcing governments to act and conform. Thus, democratic dyads are less likely to impose sanctions on each other, or are of shorter duration, than are jointly non-democratic or mixed dyads. Clifton Morgan and Navin Bapat (2003) engaged in a study similar to that of Rodman, nevertheless, asking the question of how MNCs can be forced into complying with sanctioning efforts, i.e. stopping transactions with the ‘target’. The focus was on cases in which there seems to be an economic disconnect in trade balance between home and host nation. The main point of argument in this study is that of benefit, as was that of Rodman, however, how can benefit for disengagement be made more lucrative for MNCs to induce compliance then continued economic trade. In this study deterrence in the form of levied fines is used. The argument follows the idea that if fines outweigh engagement with the ‘target’ deterrence is ensured. Nevertheless, as the world is becoming more and more
globalized and sister corporations can easily be formed and established in any given nation, placing the activities outside of the sphere of influence of the ‘sender’, this will offset and often circumvent sanctioning efforts, fines and law suits are not the deterrent they once were. Not only will dummy corporations be established to maintain business relationships with the ‘target’, it will directly hurt the ‘sender’ due to decreased taxable income, and so representing a win-loose situation in favor of the ‘target’. Furthermore, as industrial lobby groups are so powerful in national and international agenda formulation, in most sanctioning cases “grandfather clauses” are incorporated into the new laws, allowing companies who were engaged with the ‘target’ prior to the establishment of the sanctions regime to continue their business relationships following the imposition of this foreign policy tool. Peter Andreas, lecturer at Brown University, published a study in 2005 providing an analytical approach toward understanding the consequence of sanctions. Unlike previous literature stressing social welfare losses of the ‘target’ Andreas focuses on the criminalization of ‘target’ populations. In his study, Andreas features the case of the former Yugoslavia; however, implications most certainly can be applied to any other state. According to Andreas “sanctions unintentionally contribute to the criminalization of the state, economy (corruption), and civil society of both the ‘target’ country and its immediate neighbors, fostering a symbiosis between political leadership, organized crime, and transnational smuggling networks” (Andreas, 2005). Within military dictatorships this criminalization will be contained within the ruling elite, however utilizing the general public to carry out the work of the junta. Myanmar is a good example of this argument. Myanmar today, is the world’s second largest heroin producer following Afghanistan, and a facilitator of human trafficking across regional Asian borders. This condition has led to an unintended result along its frontiers, increasing drug addiction and the prevalence of HIV/AIDS; primarily along the Yunnanese border area. This situation has strained relationships between Myanmar and China, however, due to Myanmar’s geopolitically and economic strategic significance for China, relationships have been maintained. Furthermore, this relationship illustrates how US and EU sanctions against Myanmar could never have the desired effect policy formulators would hope to achieve.

**Conclusion**

Economic sanctions are intended to inflict economic distress upon the ‘receiver’. Sanctioning worked well in a time when nations by enlarge engaged in bilateral trade, or when one nation, i.e. United States, was the center of global trade; i.e. the global hegemonic power. This position gave leverage for coercion and provided a deterrent for the ‘receiver’ to discontinue its actions. As the world has undergone large changes in national and regional identities, this international relations game is no longer suitable, at least not as a stand-alone tool. Globalization has linked nations tighter together, not just those who previously had been interconnected, but today has diversified relations to such an extent that if sanctions are expected to achieve their aims, a large scale multilateral effort is required for this to occur. Due to the critical literature, and it seems the enlightenment of scholars, the use of ‘smart sanctions’ has become a focus of attention, providing a new, and supposedly more effective and tailored foreign policy weapon. ‘Smart sanctions’ as the word already indicates, targets those elements on which the ‘target’ state relies for its income. Nevertheless, the problems of ‘smart sanctions’ are not so indifferent to those of former comprehensive sanctions thus only making this another academic discussion. Targeted sanctions are more easily tracked and policed, however, national agendas and economic interests will always be in the forefront of action, thus rendering sanctions ineffective, but providing ‘lip service’ to the international community.
to demonstrate that one is not indifferent to the problems of others. The use of targeted sanctions against Iran and Myanmar has inflicted major economic costs, nevertheless to the detriment of the general public rather than the ruling elite and can so be argued to have failed to reach its aims. Constructive engagement, the balanced use of ‘carrots’ and ‘sticks’, has been argued to be more effective than comprehensive or even targeted sanctions in achieving policy aims. The United States foreign policy towards Myanmar, under Secretary of State Clinton, pushed towards constructive engagement with the Junta in 2009. Elections will be held this year (2010), however, they will never be free and fair. Holding elections, however, represents a good first move away from a totalitarian military regime. As Secretary of State Clinton discovered, Myanmar’s resolute position will not be able to be challenged even when using forms of constructive engagement, but lacks a viable alternative. The US government still maintains the policy of constructive engagement with the junta, as recent high level meetings have been held between the junta and the US, however, I believe that only through the threat of military force will the US be able to achieve compliance by the junta.

To conclude this discussion, a summary of the variables proposed by many of the scholars for the achievement of successful sanctions is provided. Some of the variables provided have come about a natural process of rationalization in the literature, while others just seem to be common sense.

What to consider when imposing sanctions?

1. **Target** - Is the target self-sufficient? If the target state is self-sufficient, sanction policies will inevitably fail to coerce change.

2. **Partners** - If the ‘target’ is not self-sufficient, we need to identify who the main trading and political allies of the ‘target’ are? Once we have identified the partners we need to establish whether or not they will aid in the enforcement of sanctions or whether they will continue their mutually beneficial relationships despite international pressure. Is the ‘sender’ the main trading partner of the ‘target’; sanctions will have the ability to succeed, however, if implemented swiftly? Is the ‘sender’ only one among many partners, sanctions will have to take a coordinated multilateral approach to reach resolve.

3. **Commodities** - What kind of natural resources does the ‘target’ have? Does the ‘target’ have any commodity which may be of high interest to other nations? (Oil, diamonds). Does the proposed ‘target’ import anything of national importance? From where does the ‘target’ import these products? The identification of this will aid in identifying what kind of ‘smart sanctions’ can be imposed and what partners for the game need to be sought.

4. **Policy outcomes** - This was clearly stated by Hufbauer (1990) as a precondition for success and/or failure. If policy outcomes are too illusive sanctions are deemed to fail. Outcomes need to be realistic and clear, not idealistic and vague. Therefore, in today’s environment we cannot expect a full-fledged regime change without the engagement of military intervention as evidenced in Iraq. Therefore, the ‘sender’ needs to clearly define conditions essential for the ‘target’ to lift sanctions. This clarity, while maintaining narrow scopes, will aid in achieving sanction’s aims. Does the ‘sender’ have a covert agenda, sanctions will fail. Does the ‘sender’ have a humanitarian agenda, support for the episode will be obtained by the international community (see Afghanistan military intervention). Furthermore, a clear, precise and above all realistic timeframe needs to be set for the ‘target’
to comply eliminating uncertainties.

5. **Cost of enforcement** - Enforcement of sanctions can and should not be high for either ‘sender’ or ‘third party’. Too high of cost will lead to failure of the sanctions episode (Pape, 1998) due to a lack of commitment. The costs for sanctions should not amount to such levels that either the ‘sender(s)’ or third parties are weakened by these losses of decreased economic activity. Third country compensation is a big debate in the sanction’s literature today, however, in most if not all cases the main ‘sender(s)’ do not suffer such substantial losses, due to national reserves and alternatives to trade, as are the immediate smaller neighbors of the ‘target’ for whom trade with the ‘target’ may be of vital importance.

6. **Relationships** - how have relationships between ‘sender’ and ‘target’ been in the past? Has there been an amicable or confrontational relationship between ‘sender’ and ‘target’? If relationships have been largely amicable then one may be able to conclude that sanctions will not have to be enforced, or will be of short duration, to lead to resolve. If past relationships have been confrontational, sanctions will undoubtedly be imposed.

7. **Resolve vs. Irresolute** - Diplomacy should be at the front of any discussion in relation to sanctions, therefore previous relationships are a determining factor to whether or not sanctions will succeed in their aims through diplomatic means. If the ‘target’ is classified as resolute to its position, from an analysis of previous relationships, sanctions will not be able to coerce change. Is the target ‘irresolute’ regarding its position diplomatic discourse will be able to avoid the imposition of sanctions and/or military engagement.

8. **Systems** - What kind of political system prevails in both the ‘sender’ and ‘target’ nations? Is the ‘target’ democratic, the ‘sender’ will have a good chance for achieving its aim. Is the ‘target’ non-democratic, pressure groups inside the ‘target’ will not be able to pressure for change.

9. **Speed of Imposition** - Are, or will sanctions be imposed swiftly, sanctions will be able to inflict pressure upon the ‘target’. Are, or will sanctions be imposed progressively, sanctions will inevitably fail due to the ability of the ‘target’ to diversify means of income.

10. **Militarization** - Are sanctions simply threaten, without the possible use of military force the ‘target’ will view the ‘sender’ as irresolute. Military force, or the threat there of, needs to be part of the sanctioning game.

11. **Big vs. Small ‘sender’ ‘target’** - Is the ‘sender’ are small nation threatening a large state; sanctions will inevitably fail to achieve compliance. Are sanctions threatened and/or imposed by a large state against a small state, the possibility of inflicting costs and achieving aims is increased.
References


